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REVIEW ESSAYS

the american constitutional order

Stephen F. Knott

Griffin, Stephen M. Long Wars and the Constitution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2013. 362pp. $39.95

Stephen M. Griffin, who joined the Tulane law faculty in 1989, specializes in
constitutional theory and history. He contends that the propensity of American
presidents to engage in war without proper authorization from Congress has
“destabilized” the American constitutional system and “deranged policy making.”
He rightly acknowledges that the struggle to define the limits of executive power
dates back to the American founding but insists that something unique occurred
in the aftermath of the Second World War.
Griffin makes a plausible case that the nation’s thirty-third president, Harry
S. Truman, founded a new “constitutional order” when he chose to intervene in
the Korean War without congressional authorization and rejected any serious
effort at “interbranch deliberation.” This was the
Dr. Stephen Knott is currently a professor of national moment at which the American political system
security affairs at the Naval War College. He was
began to decline, and with it sound policy making
formerly co-chair of the Presidential Oral History
Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the regarding the use of force. The American constituUniversity of Virginia. His books include The Reational order “underwent a major transformation,”
gan Years; Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence
replaced by a flawed “jerry-built structure” that
of Myth; Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations
led to frequent “policy disasters and constitutional
and the American Presidency; At Reagan’s Side: Insiders’ Recollections from Sacramento to the White
crises.” Congress abrogated its responsibilities
House; and Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the
regarding the most important decision any govWar on Terror, and His Critics. His forthcoming
ernment can make—the decision to go to war. The
book Washington & Hamilton: The Alliance That
Forged America, coauthored with Tony Williams,
legislative branch became, according to Griffin, a
will be published by Sourcebooks in August 2015.
“junior partner whose consent was not required to
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take the nation to war.”
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Scholars who examine war powers tend to fall into one of two camps, either
the “presidentialist” or the “congressionalist” camp, as the author puts it. One
strength of Griffin’s book is that he does not fit neatly into either category, nor
does he call for an increased role for the judiciary in the war-powers arena, unlike many of his fellow law professors. Additionally, Griffin impartially presents
the arguments of scholars and practitioners of national security affairs, a quality
frequently absent in books dealing with war powers. (See, for instance, Rachel
Maddow’s Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power [2012], or Andrew
J. Bacevich’s The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War
[2013].) He also exercises a remarkable amount of restraint when offering recommendations for change, understanding as he does that reforms hatched in the
academic lounge tend to disintegrate when they encounter reality.
Unfortunately, however, Griffin’s book falters at times in its questionable accounts of American history, although he is to be commended for doing what
many of his fellow law professors do not—taking history seriously. Nonetheless, it
is important to note that American presidents have been ignoring or manipulating Congress since the early days of the Republic: for instance, James Madison’s
covert wars in East and West Florida, or James K. Polk’s machinations prior to
the war with Mexico. Griffin’s interpretation of the conflict over the scope of executive power between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson is marred by
his claim that Hamilton’s position was “never implemented.” It was implemented
by George Washington and arguably by Jefferson as well. The latter did not, as
Griffin suggests, reject Hamilton’s broad interpretation of executive power during
his war with the Barbary pirates; Jefferson in fact acted in a duplicitous manner
toward Congress by providing it an incomplete account of his assertive executive
actions.
Griffin makes other doubtful historical claims as well. For instance, he suggests that it was the Joint Chiefs of Staff who lobbied an apparently reluctant
President John F. Kennedy to “finish off [Fidel] Castro.” The Kennedy brothers
did not need any coaxing from the Joint Chiefs regarding Castro’s removal. Griffin is also somewhat dismissive of Ronald Reagan’s role in ending the Cold War,
a subject that is at least open to debate, and he recoils at Reagan’s “astonishing
ignorance” of Cold War history and lack of interest in “matters of governance.”
Reagan in fact drove American policy toward the Soviet Union in a direction resisted by many of his closest advisers. Griffin claims that Dick Cheney was “more
staffer than politician,” yet Cheney was a member of the House of Representatives
for ten years, rising to the position of minority whip.
The author’s impartiality deserts him when he turns to the nation’s forty-third
president, George W. Bush. While more measured than most, some of Griffin’s
arguments echo those who suffer from “Bush Derangement Syndrome.” The
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/9
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author accepts the notion that Bush and Vice President Cheney represented
an existential threat to the constitutional order. He traces some of this back to
Cheney’s membership on the Iran-Contra committee, where Cheney and other
conservatives promulgated a doctrine of presidential power that was one of “the
most extreme and dangerous in all of constitutional law.” Griffin criticizes President Bush’s instructions to his attorney general in the immediate aftermath of
the 9/11 attack: “Don’t ever let this happen again.” The author considers this to
be an “impossible and dangerous order,” yet it likely would have been given by
any president, and it reflected the sentiment of members of Congress who approved Bush’s antiterror policies through legislative action and supported the use
of torture and other controversial measures, sometimes even calling for harsher
methods. That Congress failed to deliberate on these issues at greater length and
with a depth of understanding possessed by Griffin has been the rule rather than
the exception since 1789.
Griffin claims that the Central Intelligence Agency had “substantial doubts”
about Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. However,
prior to the invasion of Iraq that agency’s director told President Bush that he had
no doubts, that it was in fact a “slam dunk.” According to Griffin, the Bush administration engaged in “a general failure to comply with the rule of law,” a failure
that was accompanied by “multiple genuine threats to civil liberties.” In reality, in
comparison to John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin
Roosevelt, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney might as well have been charter
members of the American Civil Liberties Union. Also, it is simply laughable to
assert that an “executive clique” led by Bush and his Svengali-like vice president
“disabled” the ability of the public and the press to discern “reality.”
Nevertheless, Griffin makes a credible case that something is wrong with the
American constitutional order and that Congress must abandon its inclination
to see itself as a junior partner to the president. But with a membership obsessed
with its reelection prospects instead of its constitutional responsibilities, the likelihood of this occurring seems quite remote.
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